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The propositional mu-calculus is a propositional logic of programs which incor- 
porates a least fixpoint operator and subsumes the propositional dynamic logic of 
Fischer and Ladner, the infinite looping construct of Streett, and the game logic of 
Parikh. We give an elementary time decision procedure, using a reduction to the 
emptiness problem for automata on infinite trees. A small model theorem is 
obtained as a corollary. 0 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
First-order logic is inadequate for formalizing reasoning about 
programs; concepts such as termination and totality require logics strictly 
more powerful than first-order (Kfoury and Park, 1975). The use of a least 
lixpoint operator as a remedy for these deficiencies has been investigated by 
Park (1970, 1976), Hitchcock and Park (1973), de Bakker and de Roever 
(1973), de Roever (1974), Emerson and Clarke (1980), and others. The 
resulting formal systems are often called mu-calculi and can express such 
important properties of sequential and parallel programs as termination, 
liveness, and freedom from deadlock and starvation. 
Dynamic logic (Pratt, 1976; Harel, 1979) applies concepts from modal 
logic to a relational semantics of programs to yield systems for reasoning 
about the before-after behavior of programs. Analogous to the modal logic 
assertions 0 p (possibly p) and 0 p (necessarily p) are the dynamic logic 
constructs (A ) p and [A] p. If A is a program and p is an assertion about 
the state of a computation, then (A ) p asserts that after executing A, p can 
be the case, and [A] p asserts that after executing A, p must be the case. 
* The work of the second author was supported in part by NSF Grant MCS-8302878. 
249 
0890-5401/89 $3.00 
Copyright 0 1989 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights 01 reproduction m  any form reserved. 
250 STREETTAND EMERSON 
Propositional versions of the mu-calculus have been proposed by Pratt 
(1981) and Kozen (1982). These logics use a least lixpoint construct to 
increase the expressive power of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) of 
Fischer and Ladner (1979). Kozen’s formulation captures the infinite 
looping construct of Streett (1982) and subsumes Parikh’s game logic 
(1983a, 1983b), whereas Pratt’s logic is designed to express the converse 
operator of PDL. The filtration-based decision procedure and small model 
theorem obtained for PDL extend to Pratt’s mu-calculus, but the ability to 
express infinite looping renders the filtration technique inapplicable to 
Kozen’s version. 
Kozen ( 1982) and Vardi and Wolper (1984) have obtained exponential 
time decision procedures for fragments of Kozen’s mu-calculus. Both 
fragments can express all of PDL, but are not strong enough to capture the 
infinite looping construct of Streett (1981). Kozen and Parikh (1983) have 
shown that the satisfiability problem for the full propositional mu-calculus 
can be reduced to the second-order theory of several successor functions 
(SnS). By results of Rabin (1969) this supplies a decision procedure for the 
propositional mu-calculus, but one which runs in non-elementary time, i.e., 
time not bounded by any fixed number of compositions of exponential 
functions. Meyer (1974) has shown that Rabin’s algorithm for SnS cannot 
be substantially improved; SnS is inherently nonelementary. 
In this paper, we show that the satisfiability problem for sentences of the 
mu-calculus can be reduced to a certain emptiness problem for finite 
automata on infinite trees (Rabin, 1969; Hossley and Rackoff, 1972). A 
result of Streett (1981) shows that this reduction can be used to derive a 
triple-exponential time decision procedure for the propositional mu- 
calculus. Vardi (1984) has recently claimed a better upper bound for the 
automata theoretic emptiness problem, which would lead to an exponential 
space decision procedure. 
2. SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 
DEFINITION 2.1. The formulas of the propositional mu-calculus are: 
(1) propositional letters P, Q, R, . . . . 
(2) propositional variables X, Y, 2 . . . . 
(3) IP, p v q, and p A q, where p and q are any formulas, 
(4) (A ) p and [A] p, where A is a member of a set of program 
letters A, B, C, . . . and p is any formula, 
(5) pX.f(X) and vX,f(X), where f(X) is any formula syntactically 
monotone in the propositional variable X, i.e., all occurrences of X inf(X) 
fall under an even number of negations. 
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A sentence is a formula containing no free propositional variables, i.e., 
no variables unbound by a p or v operator. Sentences are interpreted in 
Kripke structures (borrowed from Kripke’s semantics for modal logic 
(Kripke, 1963)), . m which propositional letters denote subsets of states and 
program letters denote binary relations on states. 
DEFINITION 2.2. A Kripke structure is a triple ( U, k, -+ ), where U is 
a universe of states, b is a satisfaction relation between states and 
propositional letters, and -+ gives, for each program letter A, a binary 
relation +A on states. 
DEFINITION 2.3. A model is a Kripke structure with the satisfaction 
relation k extended to all sentences by means of the following rules: (In 
what follows we use informally the notion of a formula being satisfied 
under an interpretation of its free variables.) 
(1) x+ipiffx~p, 
(2) x k P v 4 iff x k P or x k 4, 
(3) x+pAqiffx~pandx+q, 
(4) x l= (A ) p iff for some state y, x -+A y and y l= p, 
(5) xl [A]piffforeveryysuchthat~+~y,yl=p, 
(6) x k @‘.f(X) iff xEn{Sz UIS= {y/y b f(X) with X inter- 
preted as S} }, 
(7) x k vX.f(X) iff XEU{SL UlS= {yly l==f(X) with X inter- 
preted as S} }. 
In a sentence &Y.f(X), f denotes a monotone function (monotonicity is 
ensured by the syntactic monotonicity of the formula f(X)) on sets of 
states, and pX.f(X) is interpreted as the least lixpoint of this operator, 
i.e., the smallest set S of states such that S=f(S). The sentence vX.f(X) 
denotes the greatest lixpoint of the functionf: The sentences pLX.f(X) and 
vX.f(X) are dual, i.e., vX.f(X)= 1 pX.1 f(lX). 
EXAMPLE. Here are some rather trivial lixpoint sentences: 
(1) pLX.X=faZse, vX.Xr true, 
(2) pX.PcvX.Pr P, 
(3) pX.X v P= P, vX.X v PEtrue, 
(4) pX.X A P-false, vX.X A P-P, 
(5) pX. (A)Xr false, 
(6) vX. [A] X- true. 
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EXAMPLE. The sentence vX. (A )X is true at x if there is an infinite 
chain of A edges from x. It is equivalent to the infinite looping construct 
AA of Streett (1982). Its negation, 1 vX. (A )X, can also be written as 
@k’. [A]X (VA in the notation of Streett). 
EXAMPLE. The sentence pX. P v (A) X is true at a state x if there is a 
chain (possibly empty) of A edges leading from x to a state satisfying P. It 
is equivalent to the sentence (A* ) P of PDL. 
EXAMPLE. In PDL, if a is a regular expression over the alphabet of 
program letters, we can form a sentence (a) p, which is true at a state 
when there is a chain of edges labelled with a string from the regular set a 
leading to a state satisfying p. The following transformation rules show 
how to translate such sentences into the mu-calculus: 
(1) <A) P*(A) P, 
(2) (a; P> p= <a>@> P, 
(3) <auB>p*(a)pv (P>P, 
(4) <a*> p*@.p v (a>X. 
For example, the PDL sentence (A*uA;(BuAC)*)(B)P is 
equivalent to the mu-calculus sentence (clx.<B)P v (A)X) v 
(A)(,uX.(B)Pv (B)Xv (A)(C)X). Note that the translation is not 
succinct; consider a PDL sentence (A u B) . . . (A u 8) P. 
DEFINITION 2.4. A formula is in positive form when all negations apply 
directly to propositional letters. The following rules can be used to convert 
a formula to positive form: 
(1) 11 P*P, 
(2) 1 (P v 9)* 1 P A -I 9, 
(3) 1 (PA q)* 1 Pl4, 
(4) 1 (A)P*CAI~P, 
(5) 1 CA1 P==-(A) 1~3 
(6) 1 ,uX.f(X) =a VA’. 1 f( 1 X), 
(7) 1 vXf(X)*pX.1f( 1 x). 
DEFINITION 2.5. Let positive(p) denote the positive form of a sentence 
p, and let not(p) denote positive ( 1 p), i.e., a positive representation of 
the negation of p. 
It will be convenient to deal only with positive sentences. It is 
straightforward to extend a satisfaction relation from positive sentences to 
all sentences by means of the rule: x ,k p iff x + positive(p). 
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3. ORDINAL RANKS AND SIGNATURES 
By the Tarski-Knaster theorem, . least and greatest fixpoints of 
monotonic functions over subsets of a set U can be defined by transtinite 
induction, i.e., the least fixpoint p(f) = U, p%(f), where 
PO(f) = 09 
Pz+ Iv-1 =fbz(f))~ 
pi(f) = u,, j. p,(f), for ,? a limit ordinal. 
Similarly, the greatest fixpoint v(f) = n, v,(f), where 
vo(S) = u 
v,+ I(f) =f(v,(f))3 
vi(f) = fl7, c i v,(f), for ;1 a limit ordinal. 
It will be useful to consider an extension of the propositional mu-calculus 
which contains, for each ordinal a and formula f(X) syntactically 
monotone in X, formulas pc,X.f(X) and v,X.f(X). A model can be exten- 
ded to cover these ordinal sentences by means of the following additional 
rules: 
(8) x V ~d’.f(X), 
(9) -r I= pz+ J.f(X) iff x I= fGf.f(JX 
(10) if /z is a limit ordinal, then x + pAX.f( X) iff for some a c A, 
x t= P,X..w)~ 
(11) x l= v,X.f(W, 
(12) x k va+1 X.S(W iff x I= S(v,X.f(X)h 
(13) if ;1 is a limit ordinal, then x + vIX.f(X) iff for all c(< A, 
x I= VJ..f(W~ 
It is then possible to recast rules (6) and (7) of Definition 2.3 in the forms 
(6’) x k pX.f(X) iff for some ordinal a, x /= ,uaX.f(X), 
(7’) x /= vX.f(X) iff for all ordinals a, x + v,X.f(X). 
DEFINITION 3.1. A mu-sentence pX.f(X) has rank a at a state x if a is 
the least ordinal such that fiL,X.f(X) is true at a. 
EXAMPLE. Consider a model with an infinite backwards chain of A 
edges ending in a state satisfying P, i.e., 
. . A x,--L . . . X,--% x,A x, /= P. 
If X, l= 1 P for x > 1, then the sentence pX. P v (A ) X has rank n at x,,, 
for na 1. 
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EXAMPLE. In a model in which there are arbitrarily long finite chains 
(but no infinite chains) of A edges from the state x, the sentence ,uX. [A] X 
will have infinite rank 3 w  at x (if every A successor of x has only bounded 
chains of A edges then ,uX. [A]X has exactly rank o at 9). 
Remark. The range of the ordinals used in connection with the fixed 
points was not specified. We could take it to be the collection of all 
ordinals, which is a proper class rather than a set. It suffices however to 
take it to be the set of all ordinals of cardinality at most that of the state 
space, since the closure ordinal of a monotone operator will not be greater. 
This ensures that the lexicographical ordered collection of bounded length 
sequences of ordinals, as used subsequently, is a well-founded set. 
Since a mu-sentence can contain other mu-sentences as subsentences, it 
is useful to associate a sequence of ordinal ranks to a sentence. 
DEFINITION 3.2. A signature is a sequence of ordinals. If s and t are 
signatures, we will write s < t to mean that s lexicographically precedes t. 
Over a set of bounded length signatures, the lexicographic ordering is a 
well-ordering. 
DEFINITION 3.3. The mu-height of a sentence is the depth of nesting of 
mu-subsentences of the sentence. 
EXAMPLE. The sentence PX. P v (A )(pY. X v (B) Y) has mu-height 1, 
since the subformula pY.X v (E) Y is not a sentence (it contains a free 
variable Xl. 
DEFINITION 3.4. Given a sentence p of mu-height n and a signature 
s=al ‘..ci,, we say that p has signature s at x if s is the lexicographically 
least signature such that the sentence obtained by replacing each mu- 
subsentence pX.f(X) of mu-height i by &,: X.f(X) is true at x. 
EXAMPLE. In a model in which the state x has countably many 
B-successors y,, . . . . yn, . . . such that PX. P v (A )X has rank n at y,, the 
sentence [B] pX. P v (A ) X has signature o at x. 
EXAMPLE. Consider pY. (pX.P v (A)(,uZ. X v (B) Z)) v (B) Y, 
with mu-height 2 and equivalent to the PDL sentence (B*)( (FIB*)*) P. 
Consider a model in which there is a chain 
If x, k I P for n > 1 then this sentence has signature 3, 2 at x9, 3, 1 at x8, 
2, 2 at x,, 2, 1 at x6, 1, 5 at x5, 1, 4 at x4, 1, 3 at x3, 1, 2 at x2, and finally 
signature 1, 1 at x1. 
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LEMMA 3.5. The following rules hold for signatures: 
(1) ifp v q has signature s at x, then either p or q has signature t < s 
at x. 
(2) ifp A q has signature s at x, then both p and q have signatures <s 
at x. 
(3) if (A) p has signature s at x, then p has signature s at some 
A-successor of x. 
(4) if CA1 P h as signature s at x, then p has signature 6s at all 
A-successors of x. 
(5) if ~x.f(W h as signature s at x, then f(,uX. f(X)) has signature 
f < s at x. 
(6) q-vX.f(X) h as signature s at x, then f(vX.f(X)) has signature t, 
where s is a prefix of t. 
Proof. We will do case (5) only. Suppose pX.f(X) has mu-height n. 
The mu-height of f(pX.f(X)) will be m b n. The mu-subsentences of 
f(pX. f(X)) can be divided into three classes: 
(1) The proper mu-subsentences of pX.f(X), with mu-height <n. 
(2) pX.f(X) itself, with mu-height = n. 
(3) Mu-sentences properly containing pX.f(X), with mu-height > n. 
If pY. g(Y) is in the first class and can be replaced by p, Y.g( Y) within 
pX.f(X) at x, then it can similarly be replaced withinf(pX.f(X)) at x. If 
pX.jjX) has rank c1 at x, then PX. f (X) can be replaced by pLpX.f(X), for 
some /3 < u, within f(,~X.f(x)) at x. Hence if pX.f(X) has signature 
s=u, “‘cl, at x, then f(pX.f(X)) will have signature t = b, ... 
Pn-,SJ?l+, . . . j?, at x, where pi d cli for i < n and fl, < a,,, so that t < s. 
4. CHOICE FUNCTIONS 
We can evaluate simple sentences in models by recursively evaluating 
subsentences. Thus to check whether or not P v (A ) Q is true at a state x 
we either confirm that P is true at x or we look for an A edge leading to a 
state satisfying Q. In order to evaluate fixpoint sentences, we will need 
to confirm the fixpoint property, i.e., that PX. f( X) = f( PX. f( X)) and 
vX. f(X) z f( VA’. f(X)). Thus evaluating a sentence may require recursively 
evaluating a supersentence and hence subsentences of supersentences and 
vice versa. The set of sentences whose evaluation is triggered in this way is 
not too large, however, and can be defined as follows. 
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DEFINITION 4.1. The FischerLadner closure of a sentence p in positive 
form, is the smallest set FL(p) of sentences satisfying the following 
constraints: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
PE FL(P), 
if q E FL(p) then not(q) E FL(p), 
if q v rEFL(p) then q, rEFL(p), 
if q A r E FL(p) then q, r E FL(p), 
if (A)qEFL(p) then qEFL(p), 
if [A]qE FL(p) then qE FL(p), 
if pX.f(X) E FL(p) then f(@.f(X)) E FL(p). 
if vX.~(X)E FL(p) thenf(vX.f(X))E FL(p). 
EXAMPLE. The Fischer-Ladner closure of the sentence +?c’. [A] X 
contains only four sentences: @I. [A] X, vX. (A ) X, [A] pLx. [A] X, and 
<A)(vX.cA)n 
EXAMPLE. The Fischer-Ladner closure of the sentence PX. P v (,4)X 
consists of the following eight sentences: 
(1) pXP.P v (A)X, 
(2) vx.1 PA [A]X, 
(3) P v (A)(pX.P v <A)X), 
(4) 1 P A [A](VX.l P A [A]X), 
(5) p, 
(6) 1 P, 
(7) (‘4XPX.P v (A >a 
(8) CAI(vX.1 f’ A CAIW, 
LEMMA 4.2. The cardinality of the Fischer-Ladner closure of a sentence 
p is linear in the length of p, i.e., jFL(p)] = O(]pl). 
Proof: A straightforward adaptation of the proof for PDL (Fischer and 
Ladner, 1979). 
The following definition includes exactly those properties of a model 
which can be easily checked by recursive evaluation of closure sentences. 
DEFINITION 4.3. A pre-model is a Kripke structure with a satisfaction 
relation k extended to positive sentences under the following constraints: 
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(1) x I= P iff x F not(p), 
(2) x b p v q iff either x ‘t= p or x b q, 
(3) x k (A ) p iff there is some edge x _tA y such that y b p, 
(4) x I= pX.fW) iffx k fW.fW). 
A pre-model is almost a model, except that rule (4) permits pX.f(X) to 
be interpreted as an arbitrary tixpoint (least, greatest, or intermediate). 
(Rule ( 1) ensures the proper complementary behavior for negated proposi- 
tional letters, conjunctions, universal program sentences, and greatest 
fixpoint sentences.) 
EXAMPLE. Consider a Kripke structure with a single state x such that 
x +A x and x + 1 P. This structure can be extended to a pre-model 
in which x + pX.P v (A)X, x + P v (A)(pX.P v (A)X), and x k 
(A )(pX. P v (A ) X). This pre-model will not, however, be a model. 
Fixpoint sentences can generate nonterminating evaluation sequences. 
For example, occurrences of pX. X and vX.X merely trigger re-evaluation 
of themselves via the fixpoint property, while pX. (A ) X and vX. (A ) X can 
generate infinite sequences of reoccurrences along a chain of A edges. The 
presence or absence of nonterminating evaluations distinguishes least from 
greatest fixpoints (both of which share the fixpoint property). Least 
fixpoint sentences must have terminating evaluations, while nontermination 
is consistent with the semantics for greatest fixpoints (this explains why 
pX. X - false and vX. X E true). 
Disjunctions p v q and existential program sentences (A )p introduce a 
complication; termination of the evaluation process depends on the choice 
of disjunct or edge used to satisfy such sentences. For example, the sentence 
@X. P v X expands to P v (pX. P v X); the disjunct P leads to termination, 
the disjunct PX. P v X to nontermination. Consider the sentence 
pX. P v (A ) X, equivalent to the PDL sentence (A * ) P, which is satisfied 
in a Kripke structure exactly when the sentence P is true somewhere along 
some path of A’s. By the fixpoint property, pX. P v (A )X is equivalent to 
the disjunction P v (A)(pX. P v (A) X). A terminating evaluation occurs 
if the A edges chosen to satisfy (A)(pX. P v (A) X) eventually lead to a 
state where the disjunct P can be chosen. Consistently choosing to evaluate 
the disjunct (A)(pX. P v (A) X) will lead to a nonterminating evaluation 
along an infinite A chain (since nonterminating evaluations are consistent 
with greatest fixpoints; this explains why vX. P v (A) X 3 (pX. P v 
(A)W v (vX.(A)X)). 
We shall consider pre-models supplied with a choice function responsible 
for guiding the evaluation of least fixpoint sentences towards termination. 
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DEFINITION 4.4. A choice function for a pre-model is a function which 
chooses, for every occurrence of a disjunction at a state, an occurrence of 
one of the disjuncts at that state, and for every occurrence of an existential 
program sentence (A ) q at a state, an occurrence of q at an A-successor of 
that state. 
DEFINITION 4.5. Any choice function over a pre-model determines a 
derivation relation between occurrences of sentences, defined by the 
following rules: 
(1) A disjunction, q v r, derives the disjunct selected by the choice 
function. 
(2) A conjunction, q A r, derives both conjuncts. 
(3) A program sentence, (A ) q, occurring at a state x, derives the 
occurrence of q selected by the choice function. 
(4) A program sentence, [A] q, occurring at x generates occurrences 
of q at all A-successors of x, 
(5) A mu-sentence, $f.f(X), derives f(@‘.f(X)). 
(6) A nu-sentence, vX.f(X), derives f(vX.f(X)). 
It should be obvious that a sentence can only derive members of its 
Fischer-Ladner closure. 
We would like to say that a pre-model is in fact a model when there is 
no infinite derivation sequence which rederives a mu-sentence infinitely 
often. However, this claim is true only when restricted to derivations in 
which the given mu-sentence appears as a subsentence of every derivation 
step, hence the following definition. 
DEFINITION 4.6. A least lixpoint sentence pLx.f(X) is regenerated from 
x to y if pX.f(X) at x derives pLX.f(X) at y in such a way that &C.f(X) is 
a subsentence of every derivation step. 
EXAMPLE. The sentence ~Y.(,uLX.(P v (A)(pY.Xv (B) Y)) v (B) Y) 
can be regenerated across a B-edge, but not across an A-edge. A derivation 
across an A-edge is possible, but requires &K P v (A )(p Y. X v (B) Y) as 
a derivation step. 
EXAMPLE. The sentence p = pX.(vX. P A (A )(pY.X v Y)) v (A) Y) is 
true when there is an infinite chain of A edges along which P is infinitely 
often true. Any model of this sentence will contain infinite derivation 
sequences rederiving p infinitely often, but the subsentence q = vX. P A 
(A ) (p Y. X v (A ) Y) must then occur infinitely often as a derivation step. 
PROPOSITIONAL MU-CALCULUS 259 
It is possible to construct a choice function such that any regeneration 
sequence from p ultimately terminates at the choice q from the derived 
disjunction q v (A ) p. 
DEFINITION 4.7. A choice function is well founded when the 
regeneration relations for least fixpoint sentences are well founded. A pre- 
model is well founded if it has a well-founded choice function. 
THEOREM 4.8, Every model is a well-founded pre-model. 
Proof Given a model, construct a choice function which always selects 
the choice with lexicographically least signature. If $f. f (X), of mu-height 
n, is regenerated from x to y, then pX. f (X) must be a subsentence of each 
derivation step. Hence each sentence in the derivation has mu-height b n, 
and thus signature of length at least n. We shall show that the signature of 
pX. f(X) decreases (lexicographically) from x to y. The derivation sequence 
must begin with pLX.f(X) => f(pX. f(X)). By Lemma 3.5, the signature of 
f(pLx. f(X)) lexicographically precedes the signature of pLx. f(X) at the nth 
position. We shall show that the remaining derivation steps cannot cancel 
this initial decrease. 
Clearly, derivation steps from conjunctions p A q and universal program 
sentences [A] p cannot increase signature, regardless of the particular 
choice function involved. The use of a choice function which selects on the 
basis of least signatures guarantees that derivation steps from disjunctions 
p v q and existential program formulas (A ) p do not increase signature. 
A derivation step may involve a lixpoint sentence pY.g( Y) or vZ.h(Z) 
which contains pX. f(X) as a subsentence. In the former case, signature 
does not increase. In the latter case, signature may actually increase, since 
the signature of h(vZ.h(Z)) may be an extension of the signature of 
vZ.h(Z). However, the net change in signature from the original sentence 
pX. f(X) at state x will still be decreasing, since extending the signature 
after the rzth position cannot cancel the effect of a decrease at the nth 
position. 
We have therefore shown that regeneration always decrease signature. 
The signatures occurring in a derivation sequence from a sentence p have 
bounded length (the upper bound is the maximum mu-height of a sentence 
in FL(p)), so that the lexicographic ordering is well founded, forcing the 
regeneration relations to be well founded. 
THEOREM 4.9. Each well-founded pre-model is a model. 
ProoJ: Suppose M is a pre-model supplied with a choice function so 
that the regeneration relation for each mu-sentence is well founded. Then 
each occurrence of a mu-sentence is associated with an ordinal, the well- 
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ordering ordinal of the regeneration relation from that occurrence. It is 
thus possible to define a signature cl = c(, , c(?, . . . . cx, for each sentence q at 
state x as follows: 
cli = lub{ rx: q at x generates mu-sentence r at y, r has mu-depth i, and 
r at y has regeneration ordinal CZ}. 
The labelling L of A4 can be extended so that for each sentence q and state 
x, if qE L(x) then qcC is added to L(x), thereby annotating each sentence 
with its signature in the labelling. It is now easy to argue by induction on 
formula structure and signature that 
qEE L(x) implies x k qc(. 
Thus qE L(x) implies x k q, and A4 is indeed a model. This completes the 
proof of Theorem 4.9. 
COROLLARY 4.10. For any sentence p, if p has a model, then p has a 
model of bounded outdegree d I p 1. 
Proof Consider the subset of FL(p) containing just the existential 
program sentences of the form (A) q. This subset is no larger than Ip(, 
since each program letter in p contributes at most one member to this sub- 
set. Any model M of p has, by Theorem 4.8, a well-founded choice function 
and thus defines a well-founded pre-model. Take the underlying Kripke 
structure of M and prune it to outdegree d 1 pi by allowing edges x +A y 
iff x k (A)q, where (A)qEFL(p) and y is chosen for (A)q at x by the 
choice function of the original model M. The resulting, pruned Kripke 
structure together with the choice function still defines a well-founded pre- 
model M’, which is of bounded outdegree < IpI. By Theorem 4.9, M’ is 
indeed a model. 
5. THE DECISION PROCEDURE 
Corollary 4.10 states that every satisfiable mu-calculus sentence p has a 
model (or equivalently, a well-founded pre-model) with outdegree d IpI. 
Such structures can be unwound into labelled trees of outdegree (arity) 
< IpI which are suitable as input to finite automata on infinite trees 
(Rabin, 1969; Hossley and Rackoff, 1972). In this section we will sketch 
how, given a fixed mu-calculus sentence p, to program such an automaton 
to recognize well-founded pre-models for p. 
The input for the automaton for p will be a tree T where each node x has 
been labelled with a subset of FL(p). We will assume that each disjunction 
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occurring on a node is marked to indicate a chosen disjunct. We can 
number the existential program sentences occurring in FL(p) as 
(A,)q,, ...> (A,) qn and assume that whenever (Ai) qi occurs on a node, 
the choice function will choose the ith successor of the node. The 
automaton for p is built from two component automata, which we call the 
local automaton and the global automaton. 
The local automaton is a large but simple deterministic automaton on 
infinite trees. It performs three tasks. First, it ensures that p is among the 
sentences labelling the root of the input tree. Second, it guarantees that at 
every node, the subset S G FL(p) on that node is locally consistent, i.e., 
that 
(1) qt5S iff not(q)#S, 
(2) q v  reS iff qES or reS, 
(3) if q v r E S then its chosen disjunct E S, 
(4) if fiX.f(X) E S iff J(@.f(X)) E S, 
(5) &Y.f(X) cannot regenerate itself within S. 
Third, it checks that the input tree is edge consistent, i.e., that 
(1) if (A,)q, occurs on x, then the ith successor of x is labelled with 
the sentence q,, 
(2) if [A]q occurs on X, then for all i such that A = Ai, the ith 
successor of ,X is labelled with q. 
The local automaton can be built with O(2’PI) states; it needs to remember 
subsets of FL(p). 
The global automaton is a smaller but more sophisticated nondeter- 
ministic automata on infinite strings; it will be run down every path of the 
input tree. Its purpose is to look for an infinite regeneration sequence for 
some mu-sentence in FL(p). It nondeterministically selects an occurrence 
of a mu-sentence and a chain of nodes leading from that occurrence. At 
each node in this chain it determines whether a regeneration sequence 
could continue across the node. In order to do this, it must remember the 
final derivation step from the preceding node, i.e., the existential or univer- 
sal program sentence which extended the derivation across a program edge. 
The global automaton accepts if it can find a regeneration sequence which 
regenerates pX.f(X) infinitely often. The global automaton needs only 
O(Jpl) states, since it remembers only single sentences in FL(p). 
Since the global automaton accepts when it finds an infinite regeneration 
sequence, an input tree will be a well-founded tree model only when it is 
accepted by the local automaton and every path of the input tree is rejected 
by the global automaton. 
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It is possible to take the nondeterministic global automaton and convert 
it to a deterministic automaton which accepts exactly the paths rejected by 
the original automaton (such a construction is given by McNaughton, 
1966). Unfortunately, the new automaton will have 0(2*‘“‘) states, since 
McNaughton’s construct involves a double exponential blowup. This new 
automaton can be combined with the local automaton to produce a single 
automaton on infinite trees, with 0(22’“‘) states, which accepts only well- 
founded pre-models for p. The sentence p is satisfiable if and only if this 
final automaton accepts a non-empty set of input trees. Hossley and 
Rackoff (1972) give a decision procedure for testing whether or not an 
arbitrary infinite tree automaton accepts an empty or non-empty set of 
input trees; their decision procedure runs in time doubly exponential in the 
size of the state space of the automaton. We have thus arrived at a decision 
procedure for the propositional mu-calculus which runs in time quadruply 
exponential in the length of the sentence tested. 
This decision procedure can be improved by noting that the global and 
local automata can be combined to yield a single complemented pairs 
automation with O(2”‘“‘) states but only O(2’pl) pairs. The emptiness 
problem for complemented pairs automata with n states and m pairs is 
decidable in time O(2n .2’“). (Complemented pairs automata and their 
emptiness problem have been investigated by Streett, 1981.) This yields a 
triply exponential time decision procedure for the mu-calculus. 
Vardi (19X4) considers the following automata theoretic problem: given 
an infinite tree automaton and an infinite string automaton, is there any 
input tree which is accepted by the infinite tree automaton while having 
every path rejected by the infinite string automaton. Vardi claims that, if 
the tree automaton has n states and the string automaton m states, 
then this emptiness problem is decidable in space polynomial in n .2”. 
This result would yield an exponential space decision procedure for the 
mu-calculus. 
An exponential space upper bound would be tantalizingly close to the 
exponential time lower bound which is currently the best known. This 
exponential time bound is a trivial extension of the Fischer and Ladner 
(1979) lower bound result for PDL. 
The propositional mu-calculus satisfies a finite model theorem: every 
satisfiable sentence has a model with finitely many states. This result 
is an easy corollary of a result about automata on infinite trees: every 
automaton recognizable set of trees must contain a linitely generable tree, 
i.e., a tree obtained from unwinding a finite graph. Every satisfiable mu- 
calculus sentence p thus has a finite graph which unwinds into a model. In 
fact this finite graph is a finite model. 
The results of this paper are easily extended to include multiple fixpoints 
as described by Vardi and Wolper (1984). Informally, an n-tuple of 
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formulas f, (X, , . . . . X,), . . . . f(X,, . . . . X,,) (where the Xis are free variables) 
denotes a monotonic function on tuples of sets of states. The least or 
greatest fixpoint of this function will be a tuple of states; selecting a com- 
ponent of this tuple yields a single set of states, i.e., a suitable interpretation 
for a sentence. 
DEFINITION 5.1. The mu-calculus of multiple fixpoints includes the 
following sentences: If, for 1 d i d n, ,f;(X, , . . . . X,) is a formula syntactically 
monotone in all the free variables X,, . . . . X, (which need not be all the free 
variables in the f;fi’s), then for 1 < i<n, pX,(X,, . . . . X,).(fi(X,, . . . . X,), . . . . 
f,(X,, . . . . X,)1 and VXi(X,, . . . . X,,).(fI(XI, . . . . X,1, . . ..f.(X,, . . . . X,)) are 
formulas (with semantics described informally above). 
The fixpoint property for multiple fixpoints is cumbersome to express 
without abbreviation. So, for 1 < idn, let pI abbreviate pX,(X,, . . . . X,). 
(f,(X,, . . . . X,), . . . . f,(X,, . . . . X,)). Then the fixpoint property for least 
fixpoints can be written as: pi -fj(pl, . . . . p,). 
Multiple fixpoints can be used to give a succinct (i.e., linear) translation 
of PDL into the propositional mu-calculus. The translation rule 
(c( u j ) p 3 (c( ) p v (b ) p (which causes a potential exponential blowup 
through the duplication of p) can be replaced by the rule 
(01 u /I) p * pX(X, Y). (A Y v BY, P), which uses a double tixpoint to 
avoid duplication of p. Other uses of multiple lixpoints are discussed by 
Vardi and Wolper (1984). 
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